What are the species boundaries of face processing ? Using a face-feature morphing algorithm, image series intermediate between human, monkey (macaque), and bovine faces were constructed. Forced-choice judgement of these images showed sharply bounded categories for upright face images of each species. These predicted the perceptual discrimination boundaries for upright monkey^cow and cow^human images, but not human^monkey images. Species categories were also well-judged for inverted face images, but these did not give sharpened discrimination (categorical perception) at the category boundaries. While categorical species judgements are made reliably, only the distinction between primate faces and cow faces appears to be categorically perceived, and only in upright faces. One inference is that humans may judge monkey faces in terms of human characteristics, albeit distinctive ones.
I N T RODUCT ION
Adult humans are extremely good at identifying adult human faces. In one study, error-free recognition was reported for over 2000 di¡erent portraits in an oldn ew recognition task (Standing et al. 1970) . We can also recognize individual monkey faces, and we are sensitive to the vertical orientation of the portrait, whether it is of a monkey or a human face (Wright & Roberts 1996) . This and like ¢ndings beg the question`What is the nature of the human ability to recognize individual faces across species boundaries?' One possibility is that a single template serves face perception across di¡erent species. It would use the general architecture and image properties of the upright face, including the vertical bilateral symmetry of the spatial arrangement of two eyes above a nose and a mouth (Johnson & Morton 1991) . Face expertise may then generalize to all faces, whatever the species, as long as they share some of the requisite image characteristics.
An alternative idea is that face templates are speciesspeci¢c. There is some support for this notion from neuropsychological reports. Brain lesions can selectively disrupt recognition for human and for animal faces in patients such as livestock farmers who have experience of individual animals as well as people (MacNeil & Warrington 1993; Assal et al. 1984) . If face recognition by humans is species-based, then there may be categorical perception (CP) for face images from di¡erent species. CP occurs when members of a class of stimuli which vary in their sensory characteristics are nevertheless processed as if they are equivalent. If separate categories exist for di¡erent species' faces, then the identi¢cation and the discrimination of arti¢cial face images intermediate between faces of each species should be discrete, and the identi¢cation contour should predict the discrimination boundary. That is, the function that describes the discrimination of items in the series should be discontinuous: at the categorical boundary, discrimination should be enhanced with respect to the actual physical di¡erence between the stimuli. But if a single categorical prototype informs processing of faces of all species, there should be no such systematic sharpening between species' faces. Furthermore, if CP is related to expertise with faces, then where it occurs it should be evident for upright but not for inverted faces. There is strong developmental, experimental and neuropsychological evidence that in experts such as adult human observers, face processing is engaged automatically only when faces are upright (Yin 1969; Goldstein 1975; Diamond & Carey 1977 , 1986 Farah et al. 1995) .
This experiment tests these predictions directly, using full-face images of humans, cows and macaque monkeys, systematically warped to generate controlled images (morphs) physically intermediate between those of each true species member. Image morphing allows complete control of the physical blending of stimulus properties. If there is CP for each species' face, then e¤ciency in discriminating between pairs of neighbouring images should be predicted by the boundaries of categorization of the species. The rationale is as follows: assume, for example, that a 50% monkey^50% cow face is judged to be the boundary image for the cow^monkey morph series. That is, this image is unreliably chosen as`cow' or`monkey', whereas images containing a greater or lesser proportion of monkey face are reliably chosen as monkey or cow. With CP, the perception of di¡erence is driven by the underlying categorical structure. Therefore, a simple discrimination task should be more e¤cient for items that straddle the boundary than for those that lie within it. In this example, the prediction is that image pairs (40% cow^60% monkey) and (60% cow^40% monkey) should be distinguished more accurately than image pairs (80% cow^20% monkey) and (60% cow^40% monkey). Only CP would explain discrimination e¤ciency peaks aligned to the judgement boundary.
Demonstrations of CP thus require two-phase testing: identi¢cation and perceptual discrimination over the same stimulus sets for all subjects. Where a categorical boundary is indicated in a judgement task, CP can be inferred if that boundary correlates with a peak in discrimination e¤ciency (fewest errors) in a discrimination task that requires the subject to distinguish pairs of tokens from a series where the physical distance between items is identical throughout the series.
. M ET HOD (a) Subjects
These comprised 14 volunteer adult students from Goldsmiths College, University of London, whose ages ranged from 22 to 41 years (mean age 28 years). None was familiar with individual macaque monkeys or cows.
(b) Image manipulation
Full-face photographic images of four adult humans, four adult rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and four cows (Friesian) were computer-scanned. These were source images for constructing four series of human^monkey^cow morphs, with a di¡erent individual face used as the source for each series.
For each face image (eight bit greyscale), 224 face-feature landmarks were taken, following the procedure described by Benson & Perrett (1991) . Using these landmark points, the morphing algorithm (Benson 1994) produced 12 intermediate images between each of the endpoints, human (H), monkey (M), and cow (C), as follows: 80%H^20%M, 60%H4 0%M, 40%H^60%M, 20%H^80%M, 80%M^20%C, 60%M^40%C, 40%M^60%C, 20%M^80%C, 80%C2 0%H, 60%C^40%H, 40%C^60%H, 20%C^80%H. Excluding endpoint images (100% H, M, C), a 12-image, three-way continuum was produced for each of the sets of three original images of a human, a monkey and a cow. The use of a three-way series reduces the likelihood of anchor e¡ects related to multiple exposure of endpoint images in different combinations. The elimination of 100% endpoint images from the tested series further reduces the possibility that`real' face images might be used as memorial anchors. These images were cropped, normalized for size, and ghosting reduced with image-processing software (Adobe Photoshop 2 ). Figure 1 shows one such series.
(c) Design and procedure
All subjects performed two discrimination tasks, one on a series of upright faces, the other on a di¡erent series of inverted faces. The other two series served for practice for each of the tasks. The stimulus series for practice and for experiment, their orientation, and the order of orientation were counterbalanced across subjects. The discrimination tasks were always performed ¢rst. The experiment lasted approximately 40 min, with a break between the discrimination and identi¢cation parts.
(d) Discrimination: visual ABX
Sequential choice discrimination (ABX discrimination; Liberman et al. 1957; Harnad 1987) , within each 12-image series, was the discrimination task of choice. First one (A), then another (B) stimulus image from the series is presented, followed immediately by a target stimulus (X) which is identical to either the ¢rst or second image seen (X A or X B). The subject made a manual response indicating whether the ¢rst or the second stimulus was the correct match. For each subject, every paired combination of neighbouring stimulus images (12, i.e. positions 1^2; 2^3; 3^4, etc. to 12^1) was presented four times (AB^A, BA^A, AB^B, AB^B). In addition, every combination of`gap pairs' (i.e. 1^3, 2^4) was also presented. If CP occurs, discrimination should be most e¤cient in category boundary position as indicated by the identi¢cation task (below). Only neighbouring pair results (1^2 to 12^1) are reported here, since these comprise the ¢nest test of boundary discrimination.
The image was shown on a mid-grey ¢eld on the 18 inch (14 cm) computer monitor. The image size was 967 cm at a viewing distance of 50 cm. Superlab software controlled the display and responses. When no image appeared on the screen, the unstructured background ¢eld was seen. Stimulus duration was 750 ms for stimuli A and B, while stimulus X remained on screen until the response was made. The interstimulus interval was 1500 ms between each presentation. Time-out between trials was set at 4.00 s.
Each subject performed two discrimination tasks; one for upright and one for inverted faces. Each complete set of 120 possible trials within each task was sampled randomly without replacement and was preceded by 30 trials from the practice series. Instructions, which appeared on screen before the experiment, and on paper by the side of the equipment during the practice phase, stressed that speed and accuracy would be measured, and subjects used the`Z' and`M' (leftmost and rightmost) keyboard keys for response to the ¢rst or the second stimulus. These were colour coded to aid response. After practice, subjects were asked to comment on the task, and some feedback was given. Accuracy and reaction time (RT) were logged for each trial, including practice trials.
(e) Identi¢cation task
Following the discrimination tasks, subjects classi¢ed the images seen previously. Single face images from the experimental series appeared unpredictably in either orientation, for keyed responses (M, B or Z for human, cow or monkey: these were relabelled`H',`C',`M' to help responses). Each face image appeared centrally and in an identical form (contrast, size) to the discrimination task. Each image remained on screen until the response was made, with an interval of 1s between a response and a new stimulus. In this, as in the discrimination task, a practice session preceded the experiment proper. Figure 2 shows the identi¢cation functions (categories chosen) for upright and for inverted faces, respectively. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) in which the factors were series (image set 1, 2, 3 or 4), orientation (upright or inverted), category (human, monkey or cow), and position, showed no signi¢cant main e¡ect, but a highly signi¢cant interaction of category and position (p50.001). This was the sole signi¢cant e¡ect. The between subject factor of face series failed to a¡ect this or other ¢ndings, and the following analyses report e¡ects collapsed over this variable.
R E SU LT S (a) Identi¢cationöforced-choice categories
As Figure 2 shows, boundaries were in essentially the same position whether inverted or upright faces were viewed. Category boundaries were between positions 40^60 and 60^40 for each of the three series, HM, MC and CH.
(b) Identi¢cation RTs
Inverted faces should be slower to categorize than upright images and mid-range images and mid-series images may take longer to identify than those closer to the category endpoints. ANOVA, with factors orientation (upright^inverted), category (man^monkey, monkey^cow, and cow^human) and position (80%, 60%, 40% and 20%), upheld these predictions. Upright faces were categorized faster than inverted (F 13,1 5.96, p 0.03). Mid-positions were slower than end positions ( F 39,3 10.83) (40% and 60% slowest). There was also a signi¢cant interaction of orientation and position (F 39,3 4.76, p50.01): mid-range items showed the greatest inversion decrement. 
(d) Testing boundary discrimination
The prediction from the identi¢cation functions is that discrimination will be most accurate at position 40:60/60:40 (i.e. at positions HM60, MC60, and CH60) within each condition. The position factor was transformed directly to contrast this: (40:60 versus the mean of (20:40, 60:80 and 80:20) and a three-way ANOVA (orientation, condition and position (two levels)) performed. This gave a main e¡ect of position (F 13,1 7.02, p 0.02) and an orientation^position interaction (F 13,1 8.09, p 0.01). Separate ANOVAs (condition position) for upright and for inverted images con¢rmed that the e¤ciency peak at the 40:60/60:40 position held for upright but not for inverted faces. For upright faces, position F 13,1 31.26, p50.001; for inverted faces F 0.05 (all probabilities are Bonferroni corrected). For upright faces there was a category e¡ect (F 26,2 4.06, p50.05) which did not interact with position. Human^monkey images were signi¢cantly worse than either mancow or cowhuman images (p50.02 for least di¡erence analysis). Moreover, post hoc analysis showed that the upright human^monkey images, alone of the upright images, did not show an advantage for the 40:60 pair over the mean of the other positions (t 0.8, p40.2) (e) ABX RTs Reaction times were also tested. No signi¢cant e¡ects occurred except for the three-way interaction (F 78,6 2.55, p 0.026) between condition, pair and orientation. One condition (inverted MC60) was signi¢cantly slower than all others. Importantly, correlations between individual error and RT scores for each stimulus pairing were not signi¢cant. There HM40  HM40^HM20  HM20  HM20^MC80  MC80  MC80^MC60  MC60  MC60^MC40  category boundary  MC40  MC40^MC20  MC20  MC20^CH80  CH80  CH80^CH60  CH60 CH60^CH40 category boundary CH40 CH40^CH20 CH20 CH20^HM80 Figure 3 . Mean probability of error (p) in the ABX discrimination task. Solid line, upright; dashed line, inverted.
was no trade-o¡ between accuracy and RT in the discrimination task.
. DI S C U S S ION
Participants reliably categorized upright and inverted face image morphs intermediate between di¡erent species, and category judgement under these forced-choice conditions was clearly bounded. We have shown categorical identi¢cation for these images. Did the categorical boundaries in forced-choice judgement predict ABX discrimination performance (CP)?
The answer to this is in three parts. First, categorical sharpening was reliably obtained only for upright, not for inverted images. Secondly, for upright images, pairs that straddled the category boundary (MC60/MC40 and HC60/HC40) were more accurately judged than those that fell within it. Thirdly, for the human^monkey series, this e¡ect was not signi¢cant. In addition, the upright human^monkey series was less accurate than either of the other two series. While separate categories inform the discrimination of primate from cow faces, for primates including monkey and man, a single prototype may serve face discrimination. These data add to the growing evidence that CP can be demonstrated in the domain of face images. Photographic warping procedures similar to those used here have shown CP for facial expressions (Calder et al. 1996; de Gelder et al. 1997) and for facial identity (Beale & Keil 1995) .
(a) E¡ects of inversion on categorical perception
Upright, but not inverted, faces of humans, monkeys and cows generate categorical perception in the ABX discrimination task. Faces are thought to be particularly sensitive to this manipulation, and sensitivity to facial inversion is considered a hallmark of face identi¢cation expertise. It should be noted that sensitivity to facial inversion is not con¢ned to human face experts. Sheep are good at recognizing individual sheep faces, and show orientation sensitivity for sheep from their herd (Kendrick et al. 1995 (Kendrick et al. , 1996 .
In the present study, forced-choice judgement of inverted face type was good, with boundaries indistinguishable from those for upright faces. Inverted faces may be compared with species prototypes after rotation to the canonical (upright) orientation. This process is time-consuming (inverted faces took longer to classify) and may interact with attentional and other processes. Under the time and accuracy constraints of the ABX task, the orientation-speci¢c face prototype may take too long or be too hard to engage, so other matching mechanisms for inverted faces come into play which are not dependent on facial prototypes. These could include matching on the basis of speci¢c features such as size, tone, and external contour of the image. The failure to ¢nd CP for the man^monkey series, which was nevertheless categorized appropriately in the judgement task, may be similarly explained.
Forced-choice decisions on human^monkey faces may use a slow, task-speci¢c procedure: while this shows that such accurate judgements are possible, they may not use su¤ciently reliable processing mechanisms to support the discrimination task which was speedstressed and required immediate memory. That is, the dissociations observed in this study between forcedchoice category identi¢cation (good in all conditions) and perceptual discrimination (sharp-bounded for upright primate versus cow) lend weight to the power of the CP paradigm: they show that perceptual categorical discrimination need not always follow good classi¢cation. Classi¢cation is necessary, but not su¤cient for CP.
(c) How many face prototypes? Evidence from neuropsychology Some neuropsychological evidence also suggests that knowledge of faces of di¡erent species may use distinct processing schemes. Prosopagnosia is the term given to the acquired loss of face recognition (Bodamer 1947) . The farmer WJ, who became prosopagnosic following an ischaemic incident, was signi¢cantly more impaired in recognizing individual familiar human faces than at recognizing the individual sheep in his £ock by face alone (MacNeil & Warrington 1993) . He was also better at old^new discrimination of unfamiliar sheep than at old^new discrimination of unfamiliar male faces. Thus, the speci¢city of the face-processing problem was unlikely to have been due to a loss in knowledge of particular people, but rather to the speci¢c loss of the ability to distinguish human faces. Bruyer et al. (1983) , following Bornstein et al. (1969) , report a farmer whose prosopagnosia was also limited to human faces and spared the identi¢cation of cows and of dogs. It is unlikely that this dissociation comes about because animal faces are more resistant to the e¡ects of neurological insult. Assal et al. (1984) report that MX, another livestock farmer, recovered from prosopagnosia di¡erentially: human faces were relearned, but animal faces were not. These data suggest that distinct cortical systems may serve the identi¢cation of human (including primate) faces than those of other beasts.
(d) Theoretical implications
Various models propose that face recognition is based on a vector description of face feature sets (where features are construed widely to include image properties). Neural networks can perform principal component analyses on such images, which capture these properties (O'Toole et al. 1991 (O'Toole et al. , 1994 . Neurobiological ¢ndings also suggest that localized neural networks are responsible for the analysis and identi¢cation of faces in primates (Young & Yamane 1992; Tove¨e & Cohen-Tove¨e (1993) for a review). The facial prototype tends to be located in densely populated face-space (typical faces di¡er least from each other), and the denser area can serve as an attractor basin for a neural net learning to classify or remember the face. In line with this, typical faces generate more false alarms in recognition than do distinctive ones (Valentine & Bruce 1986a; Vokey & Read 1992; Bruce et al. 1994) , and are perceived faster as faces in face^non-face categorization experiments (Valentine & Bruce 1996b ).The present experiment suggests that for most human viewers, monkey faces can be judged by human face criteria. They may even function as a particularly distinctive type of face. This is a readily testable idea. They should take longer to distinguish from non-faces than human faces, and they may be individually more memorable than human faces. Monkey faces may also be judged uglier than human faces, since distinctive human faces are judged less attractive than typical ones (Ellis et al. 1988) , and be somewhat less susceptible than human faces to the e¡ects of inversion, since distinctive faces show a reduced inversion e¡ect (Valentine 1991) . By contrast, cow faces appear to be judged in relation to a di¡erent prototype, and the memorability and perceptibilityölet alone the attractiveness or expressivenessöof cow faces cannot be predicted from knowledge of human ones.
(e) Directions
These ¢ndings leave open a number of intriguing questions: do macaque monkeys, like humans, use a single category for their own and human faces ? To what extent can these ¢ndings generalize to other primate species? Does (human) practice with monkey faces change the pattern of discrimination and the categorical structure of primate face-space ? To what extent might the tendency to individuate primate faces bè built-in' to the human face-processing system as a feature of long evolutionary standing ? Further research may help to answer these questions.
